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Abstract
Reputation is a valuable asset in online social lives and it has drawn increased attention. How to evaluate user reputation in
online rating systems is especially significant due to the existence of spamming attacks. To address this issue, so far, a variety of
methods have been proposed, including network-based methods, quality-based methods and group-based ranking method. In this
paper, we propose an iterative group-based ranking (IGR) method by introducing an iterative reputation-allocation process into the
original group-based ranking (GR) method. More specifically, users with higher reputation have higher weights in dominating the
corresponding group sizes. The reputation of users and the corresponding group sizes are iteratively updated until they become
stable. Results on two real data sets suggest that the proposed IGR method has better performance and its robustness is considerably
improved comparing with the original GR method. Our work highlights the positive role of users’ grouping behavior towards a
better reputation evaluation.
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1. Introduction
At the age of Internet, individual reputation plays the role
of fundamental blocks in building up online ecosystems, espe-
cially in the filed of e-commerce [1, 2]. Meanwhile, new chal-
lenges arise that how to create and maintain reputation in on-
line communities? To better uncover objects’ true quality, many
platforms implement online rating systems, e.g. Amazon, eBay,
Taobao, MovieLens, where users can give their feedbacks by
assigning ratings to objects [3, 4]. The ratings provide a direct
measure of reputation for the objects and further affect users’
decisions [5, 6, 7, 8]. Usually, high ratings result in high sales
whereas low ratings play the opposite role. As a result, to ex-
tract credible information from these abundant feedbacks is be-
coming a major challenge since noisy ratings are widely existed
in practical systems [9, 10, 11]. For example, some users may
give unreasonable ratings due to their poor judgement [12, 13],
and some others may purposefully guide public choices by giv-
ing maximal/minimal ratings [14, 15]. These noisy ratings can
harm the effectiveness of online rating systems and affect the
accuracy of the obtained information [16, 17, 18]. Therefore,
how to measure users’ credibility, filter out untrusted users and
ensure reliability of online rating systems are becoming urgent
tasks [19, 20, 21].
To cope with these concerns, online reputation systems are
introduced [22, 23]. These systems are capable of decision
support for Internet-mediated services and help to maintain the
healthy development of online rating systems and recommender
∗Email addresses: gaojian08@hotmail.com (Jian Gao)
∗∗Email addresses: zhutou@ustc.edu (Tao Zhou)
systems. As the core of reputation systems, a variety of user
reputation evaluation methods have been proposed [24, 25],
where each user is assigned with a reputation value based on
their rating behaviors [26, 27]. Typically, these previous meth-
ods can be divided into three categories:
• Network-based methods. As online rating systems can
be described by bipartite networks [28], the reputation for
users can be calculated by many existing networked rank-
ing methods such as PageRank [29], LeaderRank [30],
mass diffuse [31, 32] and heat conduction [33]. In these
methods, a user’s reputation is measured by the amount
of resources that the user receives in the resource-allocation
processes. Although these methods are very efficient,
they suffer from rating noises and thus have limited per-
formance [24]. As a result, these methods are not suitable
for user reputation evaluation in bipartite networks.
• Quality-based methods. Underlying an assumption that
each object has a most objective rating that best reflects
its quality [34], the quality-based methods measure a user’s
reputation by the difference between the rating values
and the estimated objects’ quality values [35]. These
methods include iterative refinement (IR) method [36],
an improved IR method [37], correlation-based ranking
(CR) method [38], reputation redistribution ranking (RR)
method [39] and the other seven methods [24, 27]. These
aforementioned methods are well-performed in user rep-
utation evaluation, however, some of them may not con-
verge and some others are not robust to spamming attacks
[24, 40]. More importantly, due to the fact that the on-
line rating system is fundamentally a socialized informa-
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tion collection platform, one object should accept multi-
ple reasonable ratings [34] since the ratings are subjective
and can be affected by users’ background and some other
factors [9, 10]. Therefore, the underlying assumption of
quality-based methods is worthy of scrutiny.
• Group-based method. Recently, a group-based ranking
(GR) method is proposed, in which users are grouped
based on their rating similarities, and users’ reputation is
calculated by the corresponding group sizes [41]. Users
are assigned with high reputation if they always fall into
large rating groups. This method is free from the assump-
tion of the quality-based methods and it has better per-
formance in evaluating user reputation on data sets with
spamming attacks. However, the method is not robust for
plenty of large-degree spammers as it’s one-step process
and the ratings are evenly contributed in calculating the
corresponding group sizes regardless of users’ reputation.
In this paper, we propose an iterative group-based ranking
(IGR) method by introducing an iterative reputation-allocation
process into the original GR method. Specifically, ratings from
users with high reputation are assigned with higher weights in
calculating the corresponding group sizes. Both the user rep-
utation and the group sizes are iteratively updated until they
become stable. This method is partially inspired by the GR
method [41], the original resource-allocation process [32, 42],
and the HITS algorithm with iterative refinement procedure [43].
When tested on two real data sets (MoiveLens and Netflix) with
artificial spammers, the proposed IGR method has excellent
performance in evaluating user reputation and its robustness in
resisting a large number of spammng attacks is considerably
improved compared with the original GR method. Further, pro-
vided some insights on the mechanism and analyzed the char-
acteristics of these methods. Results suggest that IR method
remarkably prefers large-degree users, CR and RR methods
have no obvious degree preference, and GR and IGR methods
slightly prefer small-degree users. Our work provides a fur-
ther understanding on some reputation evaluation methods and
highlights the significance of considering users’ grouping be-
haviors in designing better reputation systems.
2. Methods
We first introduce some basic notations for the user reputa-
tion evaluation methods. The online rating system can be nat-
urally described by a weighed bipartite network G = {U,O, E},
where U = {U1,U2, ...,Um}, O = {O1,O2, ...,On} and E =
{E1, E2, ..., El} are sets of users, objects and ratings (see Fig. 1a
for an illustration), respectively. Here, we use Greek and Latin
letters, respectively, for object-related and user-related indices
to distinguish them. The degree of a user i and an object α are
denoted as ki and kα, respectively. Considering a discrete rat-
ing system, the bipartite network can be represented by a rating
matrix A, where the element Aiα ∈ Ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωz} is the
weight of the link connecting user i and object α, with Aiα be-
ing equal to the corresponding rating value (see Fig. 1b). In a
reputation system, each user i will be assigned with a reputation
value, which is denoted as Ri. In the following, we will briefly
introduce the proposed user reputation evaluation method.
2.1. Group-based ranking methods
The iterative group-based ranking (IGR) method and the
original group-based ranking (GR) method are based on the
same framework. Thus, we mainly introduce the IGR method.
After the initial configuration that each user i has equal reputa-
tion, e.g., Ri = 1, the IGR method works as follows.
Firstly, for user i, the rating vector Ai is mapped to a rating-
object matrix B(i), whose element B(i)sα is defined as
B(i)sα =
{
1 if Aiα = ωs
− otherwise , (1)
where the symbol “-” stands for a non-value, which should be
ignored in the calculation (the same below). In this way, users
are grouped by their ratings, namely, users who give the same
rating ωs to object α belong to the group Γsα. Mathematically,
the group is defined as Γsα = {Ui|B(i)sα = 1}. Obviously, user i
belongs to ki different groups.
Secondly, based on the intuition that a user with poor rep-
utation should have less chance in forming big groups, we cal-
culate the size of group Γsα by considering both the rating-
object matrix B(i) and users’ reputation Ri. Mathematically, the
weighted group size Λsα is defined as
Λsα =
m∑
i=1
Ri · B(i)sα, (2)
where m is the number of users. Then, a rating-rewarding ma-
trixΛ∗ is established by normalizing matrixΛ by column. Math-
ematically, Λ∗sα = Λsα/kα.
Thirdly, referring to the rating-rewarding matrix Λ∗, the
original rating matrix A is mapped to a rewarding matrix A′.
Specifically, the rewarding A′iα that user i obtains from the rat-
ing Aiα is defined as
A′iα =
{
Λ∗sα if Aiα = ωs
− otherwise . (3)
Finally, the reputation is re-allocated to all users according
to their rewarding vectors. On the one side, if the average of
a user’s rewarding is small, most of his ratings must be devi-
ated from the majority, indicating his/her poor reputation. On
the other side, if the rewarding varies largely, he/she is also un-
trustworthy for the unstable rating behavior. Based on these
intuitions, the reputation Ri for user i is calculated as
Ri =
µ(A′i )
σ(A′i)
=
(∑α∈Oi A′iα)2∑
α∈Oi (k2i A′iα − ki
∑
α∈Oi A
′
iα)2
, (4)
where µ and σ are mean value and standard deviation, respec-
tively.
In IGR, the reputation R and the group size Λ are iteratively
updated according to Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) until the change of the
reputation |R−R′| =
∑
i(Ri−R′i)2/m is smaller than the threshold
value ∆ = 10−4. Here, R′ denotes the reputation vector at the
previous iteration step. Note that, when there is no iteration,
IGR degenerates to the original GR. A visual representation of
the IGR method is shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the IGR method. The number besides the arrow marks the order of the procedure. The symbol “-” in matrixes stands for a non-value, which
should be ignored in the calculation. (a) The original weighed bipartite network, G. (b) The corresponding rating matrix, A. The row and column correspond to
users and objects, respectively. (c) The rating-object matrix for user i, B(i). Taking U4 as an example (blue horizontal box in (b)), B(4)5,1 = B(4)4,2 = B(4)5,4 = 1. (d) The
reputation-weighted group size matrix, Λ. Taking O2 as an example (green vertical box in (b)), Λ4,2 = R2 × B(2)4,2 + R4 × B
(4)
4,2=2. (e) The rating-rewarding matrix,
Λ∗, constructed by normalizing Λ by column, e.g, Λ∗4,2 = 2/(1 + 2 + 2) = 0.40. (f) The rewarding matrix, A′, obtained by mapping matrix A referring to Λ∗, e.g.
A′4,2 = 0.40. (g) The reputation of users, R. R′ is temporal reputation in the previous iteration step. In IGR method, Λ and R′ are iteratively updated according to(d), (e), (f) and (g), as indicated by the red arrows. Finally, a stable reputation R is obtained.
2.2. Quality-based ranking methods
Quality-based ranking methods have an underlying assump-
tion that each object α is associated with a most objective rating
that best reflects its true quality Qα. As it’s really hard to tell the
true quality of objects, as an alternative, the estimated quality
ˆQα of object α is usually used, which is defined as the objects’
weighted average rating. Mathematically, it reads
ˆQα =
∑
i∈Uα RiAiα∑
i∈Uα Ri
, (5)
where Uα is the set of users who have rated object α, and Aiα
is the rating to object α from user i with reputation Ri. Here,
we consider three representative quality-based ranking meth-
ods, namely, iterative refinement (IR) [36], correlation-based
ranking (CR) [38], reputation redistribution ranking (RR) [39].
The IR method calculates the user reputation and object
quality in an iterative way. Specifically, a user’s reputation is in-
versely proportional to the difference between the rating vector
and the corresponding objects’ estimated quality vector. Math-
ematically, the difference is defined as
fi = 1ki
∑
α∈Oi
(Aiα − ˆQα)2, (6)
where ˆQα is the estimated quality value of object α. Initially,
all users have the same reputation, e.g., Ri = 1. Then, the repu-
tation of user i is iteratively updated according to
Ri = ( fi + ε)−β , (7)
where β is a tunable parameter, whose optimal value is around
β = 1 [39]. The iteration goes according to Eqs. (5), (6) and (7)
until both ˆQα and Ri converge.
As CR and RR methods are based on the same framework,
in the following, only RR is introduced. In RR, each user i
is initially with reputation Ri = ki/n, which can be essentially
seen as the user’s activity. The estimated quality of objects is
calculated by Eq. (5). To obtain the reputation Ri for user i in a
step, a so-called temporal reputation TRi is calculated, which is
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the rating vector Ai
and the estimated objects’ quality vector Qi. Mathematically,
TRi is defined as
TRi =
1
ki
∑
α∈Oi
(
Aiα − µ(Ai)
σ(Ai)
)(
ˆQα − µ( ˆQi)
σ( ˆQi)
)
, (8)
where µ and σ are functions of mean value and standard devi-
ation, respectively. If TRi is smaller than 0, TRi is reset as 0,
leading TRi being in the range [0, 1]. Then, the reputation Ri is
obtained by nonlinearly redistributing TRi via
Ri = TRθi
∑
j TR j∑
j TRθj
, (9)
where θ is a tunable parameter. Note that RR degenerates to CR
when θ = 1. In each step, both ˆQα and Ri are updated until the
change of the estimated quality | ˆQ − ˆQ′| = ∑α∈O ( ˆQα − ˆQ′α)2/n
is smaller than a threshold value ∆ = 10−4. Here, ˆQ′ denotes
3
Table 1: Some basic characteristics of real data sets. m is the number of users, n
is the number of objects, 〈kU 〉 is the average degree of users, 〈kO〉 is the average
degree of objects, and S = l/mn is the sparsity of the bipartite network, where
l is the number of all ratings.
Data set m n 〈kU〉 〈kO〉 S
MovieLens 943 1682 106 60 0.0630
Netflix 3000 2779 66 71 0.0237
the vector of objects’ qualities in the previous step, and the pa-
rameter θ is set as its optimal value θ = 3 [39].
3. Data and metric
3.1. Real rating data
We consider two commonly used data sets in online rat-
ing systems, namely, MovieLens and Netflix. Both of the two
data sets contain ratings on movies based on a 5-point rating
scale with 1 being the worst and 5 being the best. Movie-
Lens data set is provided by GroupLens project at University of
Minnesota (www.grouplens.org). Herein, we only use a small
subset, which is sampled and extracted from the original data
with the constraint that each user has at least 20 ratings and the
movies are rated by at least one of these users. In the subset,
100000 ratings are given by 943 users to 1682 movies. Netflix
is a huge data set released by the DVD rental company Net-
flix for its Netflix Prize contest (www.netflixprize.com). We
extracted a small data set by random choosing 3000 users who
have at least 20 ratings and took all 2779 movies that rated by
at least one of these users. Finally, there are 197248 ratings
in the Netflix data set. Compared with Netflix, MovieLens has
larger average user degree, smaller average object degree and
higher sparsity. The basic statistics of data sets are summarized
in Table 1.
3.2. Artificial rating data
To test the performance of different ranking methods, one
way is to calculate the ranks of all users and compare them with
the ground truth. However, in practice, we are unable to know
the ground true ranks of users in advance. As an alternative,
we manipulate the real data set by adding artificial spammers
and test to what extent these spammers can be detected by a
ranking method. In fact, two types of distorted ratings, namely,
malicious ratings and random ratings are widely found in real
online rating systems [44, 45]. The malicious ratings are from
spammers who always gives minimum (maximum) allowable
ratings to push down (up) certain target objects. The random
ratings mainly come from test engineers or some naughty users
who give meaningless ratings randomly.
As real spammers are unknown, to generate artificial rating
data sets, we add either type of artificial spammers (i.e. ma-
licious or random) at one time into the original data. In the
implementation, we randomly select d users and turn them into
spammers by replacing their original ratings with distorted rat-
ings: (i) integer 1 or 5 with the same probability (i.e., 0.5) for
malicious spammers, and (ii) random integers in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
for random spammers. Thus, the ratio of artificial spammers is
p = d/m, where m is the number of all users.
3.3. Evaluation metric
We apply two widely used metrics to evaluate the perfor-
mance of ranking, namely, recall [46] and AUC (the area un-
der the ROC curve) [47]. The recall only focuses on the top-L
ranks and its value measures to what extent the spammers can
be ranked at the top. Mathematically, the recall is defined as
Rc(L) = d
′(L)
d , (10)
where d′(L) ≤ d is the number of detected artificial spammers
in the top-L ranking list. In the following experiments, the
length of ranking list is set as L = d, at which setting recall
is equivalent to another accuracy metric named precision [46].
Larger value of Rc indicates higher accuracy of the ranking.
Next, we introduce the L-independent metric AUC. Given
the ranks of all users, the value of AUC value can be essentially
seen as the probability that the reputation of a randomly chosen
spammer is lower than that of a randomly chosen normal user
(non-spammer) [3]. To calculate AUC, at each time a pair of
spammer and normal user are picked and their reputations are
compared. If among N independent comparisons, there are N′
times the spammer has a lower reputation and N′′ times they
have the same reputation, the AUC value is defined as
AUC = N
′ + 0.5N′′
N
. (11)
The value of AUC should be about 0.5 if all users and spam-
mmers are ranked randomly. Therefore, the more the value of
AUC exceeds 0.5, the better the ranking method performs.
3.4. Self-consistency metric
For the reputation evaluation methods, there is an intuition
that a user of higher rating error should have a lower reputation
or vice versa. That is to say, for a well-performed method, the
reputation should be negatively correlated with the rating error.
Here, the rating error of a user refers to the degree of deviation
after comparing the rating Ai and the estimated objects’ quality
δi. Mathematically, for user i, the rating error δi is defined as
δi =
∑
α∈Oi |Aiα − ˆQα|
ki
, (12)
where Oi is the set of objects being rated by user i, and ˆQα =∑
i∈Uα Aiα/kα is the average rating that object α receives. In fact,
the correlation between δi and Ri measure the self-consistent of
a ranking method as δi depends on ˆQ and ˆQ depends on Ri al-
ternately. The higher the correlation is, the more self-consistent
the method is.
4. Results
4.1. Reputation evaluation
First, we consider the probability distribution of users’ rep-
utation after applying the reputation evaluation methods on the
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Figure 2: The probability distribution of users’ reputation after applying different reputation evaluation methods on the two real online rating data sets, MovieLens
and Netflix. Subfigures (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are for MovieLens; subfigures (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j) are for Netflix. R is the reputation of users. 1 − D is the
Simpson’s index of diversity.
real online rating data sets. Results are shown in Fig. 2. It
can be seen that in IR the reputation is Possion-like distributed
whereas in CR, GR and IGR the reputation is normal-like dis-
tributed. By contrast, in RR the reputation is exponential-like
distributed, which is remarkably different as the reputation of
most users is zero (see Figs. 2c and 2h). To quantify the diver-
sity of all users’ reputation from the probability distribution, we
calculate the Simpson’s index of diversity, which is denoted as
1 − D [48]. Higher value of 1 − D suggest more distinguishable
of the obtained reputation. In CR, the values of 1−D are highest
as 0.9343 and 0.9318 for MovieLens and Netflix, respectively.
In GR and IGR, the values of 1 − D are nearly the same, which
are around 0.90 and 0.88 for MovieLens and Netflix, respec-
tively. In RR, the values of 1 − D are the lowest, suggesting
that the reputation of users’ in RR is the least distinguishable.
Actually, the reputation a well-performed reputation evaluation
method assigns should be distinguishable, and CR, GR and IGR
perform better.
Then, in Figs. 3a and 3d, we show the relation between δ
and R, i.e. the self-consistency, for different methods. We note
that GR and IGR both assign a high reputation to users of low
rating errors and a stably low reputation to users of high rating
errors. By contrast, the other three quality-based ranking meth-
ods, i.e., IR, CR and RR, are not stable in dealing with users of
high rating errors, as indicated by high variation of R when δ
is large. To quantify the relation, we additionally calculate the
Pearson correlation coefficient ρ between R and δ. Results are
shown in the first row of Table 2. The values of ρ are respec-
tively −0.8166 and −0.8201 (−0.7353 and −0.7629) for GR and
IGR in MovieLens (Netflix) data set. The highest negative cor-
relations suggest the best self-consistent of GR and IGR in user
reputation evaluation.
We next consider the effect of user degree kU on deter-
mining the corresponding reputation R under different ranking
methods. Figs. 3b and 3e show the relations between kU and
R. It is worthy noticing that R in IR is positively correlated
with kU as the correlation is 0.8759 and 0.7868 for MovieLens
and Netflix, respectively. In fact, the degree kU can be essen-
tially seen as a user’s activity. Thus, the result indicates that IR
prefers users with high activity as it gives a higher reputation
to active users than inactive ones. By contrast, for the other
four methods, there is no obvious degree preference as the cor-
relations are all around 0 (see the second row of Table 2). The
main reason for these observations is that R in IR is inversely
proportional to the least mean square of the difference between
Aiα and ˆQα. As the difference is degree-dependent, in IR, large-
degree users get a higher reputation in the iteration. While CR
and RR calculate the correlation and GR and IGR calculate the
mean and standard deviation, which are all independent of the
user degree. In practice, there is another understanding of such
positive correlation for IR. The user degree can be roughly seen
as a reflection of buyers’ experiences. Users of larger degree
receive more information and they are experienced. Hence, it
can be roughly considered that large degree users have better
judgement and their reputation should be higher. However, the
straightforward index is not enough to deal with the problem as
it’s hard to dig out large degree spammers.
Further, we study how the degree of trend following affects
the reputation evaluation. The so-called degree of trend follow-
ing measures to what extent a user would like to collect objects
of high popularity. Usually, the popularity of an object is repre-
sented by its degree. Hence, a user’s degree of trend following,
denoted as φ, can be calculated as the average degree of objects
5
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Figure 3: The relation between R and δ, kU and φ, respectively. Subfigures (a), (b) and (c) are for MovieLens; subfigures (d), (e) and (f) are for Netflix. δ is the rating
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Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficient ρ between the reputation R and the rating error δ, the degree of users kU and the degree of trend following φ, respectively.
The highest correlation coefficients in each row are emphasized in bold.
Metrics MovieLens NetflixIR CR RR GR IGR IR CR RR GR IGR
ρ(δ,R) -0.4471 -0.4537 -0.3189 -0.8166 -0.8201 -0.4640 -0.3926 -0.2812 -0.7353 -0.7629
ρ(kU ,R) 0.8759 0.2318 0.1719 -0.0519 -0.0419 0.7868 0.0538 0.0040 -0.0950 -0.0904
ρ(φ,R) -0.4746 -0.0244 -0.0287 0.2141 0.2048 -0.3793 -0.0428 -0.0569 0.2368 0.2157
that rated by the user. Mathematically, it reads
φi =
∑
α∈Oi kα
ki
, (13)
where Oi is the set of objects that rated by user i, ki is the de-
gree of user i, and kα is the degree of object α. The relations
between the user reputation R and the degree of trend following
φ are shown in Figs. 3c and 3f. It can be seen that R in IR is
negatively correlated with φ as the values of ρ are −0.4746 and
−0.3793 for MovieLens and Netflix, respectively (see the third
row of Table 2). In GR and IGR, R is weak positively corre-
lated with φ as the value of ρ is around 0.2. In CR and RR, the
value of ρ is around 0, indicating that R is almost independent
of φ. To better understand these observations, we focus on the
mechanisms of these methods. In IR, the ratings from a user
of larger φ have less chance in dominating the corresponding
object’s quality, which finally results in the user’s lower repu-
tation. In GR and IGR, a lager φ ensures a stabler grouping,
which results in a user’s higher reputation. For a more intu-
itive understanding, we consider the real meaning of the dif-
ferences among the correlation coefficients. Users who always
buy things of high popularity have public taste and the informa-
tion they receive is popular to audience. Thus, it’s much harder
for them to get higher reputation compared with the users who
have their unique taste and richer information in IR. By con-
trast, users of larger degree with trend following have better
grouping behavior in collecting objects and they should have
higher reputation in GR and IGR.
4.2. Random spamming analysis
To evaluate the performance of different methods in resist-
ing random spamming, we first generate artificial data sets with
random spammers and then calculate Rc and AUC accordingly.
Results are shown in Fig. 4. When focusing on the top ranks, in-
dicated by the value of Rc in Figs. 4a and 4b, GR and IGR both
have the best performance, and IGR is more robust than GR. CR
is on a par with RR, and they both outperform IR. Further, we
note that the value of Rc increases as p increases. Specifically,
the value of Rc has a rapid growth when p is approaching a
value around 0.05. Afterwards, the value of Rc becomes stable.
The result suggests that there are some real random spammers
in the original rating data sets, and the ratio is about 0.05. When
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Figure 4: Performance of different methods on data sets with random spamming. Subfigures (a) and (b) are for Rc; subfigures (c) and (d) are for AUC. The parameter
p is the ratio of random spammers. Results are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
focusing on the overall performance, indicated by the values of
AUC in Figs. 4c and 4d, GR and IGR remarkably outperform
the other methods by giving a robust AUC value around 0.96.
CR and RR are slightly inferior as the AUC value is about 0.92.
For IR, the AUC value is significant lower, indicating its lim-
ited performance. In short, group-based methods outperform
the quality-based methods in resisting random spamming.
For a more intuitive understanding of how different meth-
ods work in resisting random spamming, in Fig. 5, we show the
effect of the user degree on reputation evaluation in parameter
spaces (R, kU). In can be seen that R is positively correlated
with kU in IR. Hence, for users with close degree, IR can ac-
curately distinguish spammers from normal users as shown in
Figs. 5a and 5f. Despite of this, IR gives a lower reputation to
many users (see Figs. 2a and 2f) but a relatively higher repu-
tation to spammers with large degree, which results in its poor
performance. Meanwhile, CR gives all users (especially some
small-degree spammsers) a relatively higher reputation, indi-
cated by most of dots being in the middle and top of Figs. 5c
and 5h. In other words, the mean of all users’ reputation in CR
is relatively higher (see Figs. 2b and 2g). By contrast, RR over
limits all users reputation, as indicated by most dots being in the
bottom of Figs. 5c and 5h, although it gives most spammers a
lower reputation. In RR, a lot of users have zero reputation (see
Figs. 2c and 2h), which results in a high false positive rate in
spam detection. GR and IGR both slightly prefer small-degree
users as they give a lower R to larger degree users (see Figs. 5d
and 5i for GR and Figs. 5e and 5j for IGR). In GR and IGR, the
reputation is normal-like distributed and the spammers are al-
ways assigned with a low R. These characteristics ensure both
GR and IGR owning the best performance in evaluating user
reputation.
To quantify the effects of the user degree on ranking, we di-
vide all users into three subgroups, namely, Low, Mid and High
according to their degrees. As the evidence of the heavy-tailed
(i.e., stretched exponential) distribution of the user degree [28],
there are only a small number of users who have large degree.
To balance the number of users in each subgroups, the intervals
of the user degree kU for groups Low, Mid and High are re-
spectively set as [kmin, kmin +0.1(kmax − kmin)), [kmin +0.1(kmax −
kmin), kmin + 0.3(kmax − kmin)) and [kmin + 0.3(kmax − kmin), kmax],
where kmin and kmax are the minimum and maximum values of
kU . In each subgroup, AUC is calculated after applying the five
methods. Accordingly, the relative ranks of these methods are
obtained. Results are shown in Figs. 6a and 6b for MovieLens
and Netflix, respectfully. It can be seen that IR has a limited
performance for Low and Mid degree spammers. CR and GR
have a good performance for High degree spammers but a poor
performance for Low degree spammers. By contrast, GR and
IGR outperform the other methods for Low degree spammers.
In ranking All spammers, the order of these methods from the
worst to the best is IR, RR, CR, GR and IGR.
4.3. Malicious spamming analysis
To evaluate the performance of different methods in resist-
ing malicious spamming, we first generate artificial data sets
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with malicious spammers and then calculate Rc and AUC ac-
cordingly. Results are shown in Fig. 7. When focusing on Rc,
GR and IGR both have the best performance when the ratio of
spammers p is small. It is worthy noticing that IGR is much
more robust than GR, since the values of Rc in GR decrease
faster than that in IGR as p increases (see Figs. 7a and 7b). CR
and RR have the similar performance, and Rc values in the two
methods increase as p increases. The performance of IR de-
pends on the data sets, and overall it outperforms CR and RR.
Moreover, we note that when p is small, the values of Rc in GR
and IGR are all around 0.8, while the values in CR and RR are
almost 0. These results suggest that there are some real mali-
cious spammers in the original data sets, and GR and IGR are
much better in resisting malicious spamming. Considering the
overall performance indicated by AUC in Figs. 7c and 7d, IGR
has the best performance as the values of AUC are over 0.95.
GR method is not robust than IGR especially when p is large.
CR and RR are robust against a large number of spammers as
the AUC values are stabilized as about 0.92. Moreover, the per-
formance of IR depends on the data sets. To conclude, in resist-
ing malicious spamming, the group-based methods outperform
the quality-based methods.
To better understand how these methods work in resisting
malicious spamming, in Fig. 8, we show the effect of the user
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degree kU on evaluating user reputation in parameter spaces (R,
kU). IR gives a high R to large-degree spammers due to its
preference to users of large kU (see Figs. 8a and 8f). CR has
no obvious degree preference as it gives high R to some users
regardless of their kU (see Figs. 8b and 8g). RR over limits
all users R by giving a almost zero reputation to lots of users
(see Figs. 8c and 8h), which increases the false positive rate in
spamming detection. In GR and IGR, the reputation is normal-
like distributed and the spammers are always assigned with a
low R (see Figs. 8d and 8i for GR and Figs. 8e and 8j for IGR).
To quantify the effects of the user degree kU on ranking,
we show the relative ranks of different methods by AUC af-
ter dividing all users into three subgroups according to kU in
Figs. 9a and 9b. It can be seen that IR has better performance
for Mid and High degree spammers. CR and GR perform better
for High degree spammers. GR and IGR outperform the other
methods for Low degree spammers although they are not com-
petitive for High degree spammmsers. Nevertheless, in ranking
All spammers, IGR again have the best performance.
5. Conclusions and discussion
In summary, we have proposed an iterative group-based rank-
ing method in user reputation evaluation by introducing an iter-
ative reputation allocation process into the original group-based
ranking method. Specifically, when calculating the correspond-
ing group sizes, ratings are assigned with higher weights if they
come from users with high reputation, otherwise ratings are as-
signed with lower weights. In the iteration, the user reputation
and the corresponding group sizes are iteratively calculated un-
til they become stable. Extensive experiments on two real data
sets suggest that the proposed method remarkably outperforms
the previous quality-based methods. Further, we provided some
insights on the mechanism and analyzed the characteristics of
these methods. Results suggest that the iterative refinement
method remarkably prefers large-degree users, the correlation-
based method and reputation redistribution method have no ob-
vious degree preference, and the group-based methods slightly
prefer small-degree users.
From the macro analysis, the group-based ranking methods
are distinguishable from the quality-based methods as the for-
mer ones assign users’ reputation by considering their grouping
behaviors while the latter ones are based on the estimation of
objects’ true qualities. The stability of assigning low reputation
to users with high rating error and the independence of the rep-
utation from the user degree ensure the effective of the group-
based ranking methods [41]. In fact, the proposed method is an
improvement of the original group-based ranking method in-
spired by the original resource-allocation process [32, 42] and
the iterative refinement method [43]. In particular, compared
to the original one, the proposed method is more robustness in
resisting a large number of spammng attacks. That is mainly be-
cause in the proposed method the ratings from users with poor
reputation have less chance in forming big groups and the repu-
tation is iteratively updated. Even though the number of spam-
mers increases, the effect of spam ratings on the whole system
9
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 200 400 600 800
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 User
 Spammer
R
kU
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
IGRRRCR GRIR
N
et
fli
x
 User
 Spammer
kU
M
ov
ie
le
ns
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
R
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
 User
 Spammer
kU
Figure 8: The relation between R and kU . R is the reputation of users, obtained by applying different methods on data sets with malicious spamming. kU is the
degree of users. The data points colored gray and pink stand for normal users and malicious spammers, respectfully. The parameter is set as p = 0.1. Results in
each subfigures are for one realization.
/RZ 0LG +LJK $OO
$8
&
/RZ 0LG +LJK $OO
$8
&
0RYLH/HQV 1HWIOL[D E
U
k
U
k
0.9840
0.9970
0.9852
0.9892
0.9638
0.9924
0.9802
0.9748
0.9628
0.9978
0.9988
0.8558
0.8982
0.9887
0.9985 0.9414
0.8940
0.9891
0.9992
0.9394
0.9931
0.9986
0.9380
0.9939
0.9780
0.9936
0.9371
0.9788
0.9765
0.9992
0.9705
0.9207
0.9148
0.9675
0.9573 0.9414
0.9094
0.9747
0.9929
0.9267
Figure 9: Comparison of difference methods in ranking malicious spammers with different degree kU . Subfigures (a) and (b) are for MovieLens and Netflix,
respectively. According to kU , All users are divided into three subgroups, namely, Low, Mid and High. In each subgroup, AUC is calculated after applying different
ranking methods. Accordingly, the relative ranks of these methods are obtained. The parameter is set as p = 0.1. Results are averaged over 100 independent
realizations.
is restricted and the reputation of spammers decays through the
iterations.
Our work provides a further understanding on the mech-
anism of some user reputation evaluation methods and gives
some insights on the significance of considering users’ group-
ing behaviors in enhancing the algorithmic performance. The
proposed method is not only better in accuracy and robustness,
but also easier to be implemented. Traditionally, a well-performed
method should be convergent to a unique reputation vector [49],
however, most of the previous reputation-based ranking meth-
ods cannot guarantee convergence [24]. Although extensive
simulations suggest that the proposed method can be converge,
we still expect further theoretical analysis to justify it. More-
over, the previous studies either assume a continuums of rating
values such as the correlation-based method or underly the as-
sumption of a discrete rating system such as the group-based
method. In other words, how the continuous vs. discrete-valued
ratings affect the user reputation evaluation is still an open issue
and worth of further consideration [49]. As future works, we
could consider applying the proposed method to rating systems
with higher-resolution scales [50] and designing more reputa-
tion evaluation methods that can make best use of users’ group-
10
ing behaviors [9].
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